JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. However, this is largely a false distinction, a product of peculiar circumstances associated with the cold war, and one which is becoming increasingly anachronistic in the post-cold war era. In order to understand international relations in this era, a reintegration of the discipline is necessary. This article considers three sets of issue areas in which appeals to themes normally associated with political economy are necessary to understand national security concerns. It explains how the cold war temporarily allowed the salience of these issues to recede, and why they are likely to be of increasing importance in contemporary international politics. It concludes with a brief survey of how these influences are likely to affect the national security of a variety of states in the coming years.
100 years, is the economic causes of war. Manchester School economists in the nineteenth century saw a negative relationship between free trade and war.6 Others see conflict emerging from interstate competition over access to markets and raw materials.7 More generally, Gilpin (1981: 67) states that 'in a world of scarcity the fundamental issue is the distribution of the available economic surplus', while Stopford and Strange (1991: 204, see also 209-11) see the post-cold war era as one characterized by states 'more directly engaged in the competition for shares of the world's wealth'.
In practice, there are three principal ways in which economic forces act as a source of war: changes in relative economic growth, internal economic dislocation, and incompatible national economic strategies.8 Changes in relative economic growth are argued to contribute to war by scholars who emphasize the importance of equilibrium between power and privilege in the international system. Under such conditions, states are satisfied with the status quo.9 According to this school of thought, because states tend to grow at differential rates, there is a natural impetus for the international system to drift away from equilibrium. Since power derives from underlying economic capacity, states that are growing faster perceive a divergence between their power and position in the international pecking order. Such states force a confrontation to revise the status quo, and this is often resolved by war (Gilpin, 1981; Liska, 1957 Liska, , 1963 Organski, 1968 : 364-7; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Doran, 1983; Kennedy, 1980: 291-360) .
Internal economic dislocation can contribute to conflict for a number of reasons deriving primarily from the pressures that governments can find themselv7es under as a consequence of hard times. Such governments may resort to 'military Keynesianism', that is, efforts at pump priming by expanded military spending. These measures can contribute to war by heightening the security dilemma, creating a militaristic mind-set, or by the purposeful extension of military Keynesian tactics. Hard times can also increase the perceived stakes in struggles for international economic opportunity (see, for example, LaFeber, 1963). States may also engage in military adventures to divert attention away from failed domestic policies, or such dislocation may radicalize politics in general (see Pion-Berlin, 1985 ; also Rosecrance, 1963; Levy, 1989) . The interwar depression, for example, is often cited as contributing to the rise of Nazism in Germany and more broadly to the Second World War (Rich, 1973: 17--27; van Riel and Schram, 1993) .
Conflicts can also be initiated or exacerbated by incompatible national strategies.. Japan's interwar grand strategy, for example, could not help but cause confrontation with the USA and Britain (Barnhart, 1987) . Often such strategies unintentionally drive conflict as a consequence of the unintended effects of economic policies, as Viner (1948: 29) noted with his claim that mercantilist strategies 'served to poison international relations'. Contrapositively, there is Kennedy's (1983) argument that one of the reasons why the British empire lasted so long was because its liberal international management ruffled few feathers. Additionally, economic strategies may not only be incompatible, they may backfire. French financial diplomacy in the interwar period was intended to influence German policy but may instead have contributed to the deterioration of the situation. As Paul Einzig (1931: 145) presciently argued in 1931, France's policy was short-sighted and invited self-defeating international financial chaos. He added a collapse of the reichsmark is certain to bring about a complete political upheaval in Germany. It is highly probable that either the extreme nationalists or the communists will then acquire power. In either case, the French political influence over Germany would cease.
Strategy and the budget constraint
The incompatibility of national economic strategies calls attention to the issue of grand strategies in general. Avoiding unintended (and selfdefeating) provocation is a necessary component of strategy, but it is not sufficient. Two central questions remain: how to form an optimal grand strategy, an exercise in setting priorities and reconciling ends and means; and what constraints are imposed on crisis and wartime operations by limited resources. These are issues at the heart of security studies -and they are also fundamentally questions of political economy. In fact it is notable that two concerns we have identified as central -economic growth and grand strategy -are the two principal questions on which the entire field of economics is based: (1) the causes of economic growth (the full title of Smith's book is An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations); and (2) efficient allocation and distribution, given scarcity (the essential microeconomic question).
To reiterate, the construction of grand strategy is a fundamentally economic question; further, a state's budget constraint defines the limits of its power. Understanding or failing to recognize these limits often makes the difference between successful and unsuccessful foreign policy. In the context of a crisis or war, retaining international solvency (particularly with regard to the balance of payments), mobilizing and extracting resources from society, and maintaining domestic economic stability are all crucial for success. These issues are ubiquitous and have been highly consequential. Financial problems plagued the Confederacy during the American Civil War (Ball, 1991; Bensel, 1990) , while during the Suez crisis Britain was forced to renounce its operation in order to relieve pressure on the pound (Kunz, 1991) . Russia was unable to harness its economy adequately before and during the First World War (Gatrell, 1994) . France was plagued by economic weakness during the Ruhr crisis (Schuker, 1976) and financial constraints contributed to British and French appeasement policies leading up to the Second World War (Ferris, 1989; Girault, 1983; Frankenstein, 1983) .
Clearly, there exists a rich tradition of integration between issues associated with political economy and security studies, which is essential to understanding state power as well as the causes and courses of conflict and war.10 The intellectual history of these issues can be traced to the nineteenth century and before, and the intimate association between the two was commonly assumed and understood prior to the cold war.
MIODERN ISSUES: ACTION AND REACTION
Modern issues emerge from the consequences of linkages between political economy and security in the context of a well-developed international economy. The tugging and hauling of international economic influences -exposure to the international economy -and states' efforts to balance their desires for increased wealth and maximal security, create a distinct class of concerns for states. The increasing size of the international economy dating from the last quarter of the nineteenth century presented states with new sets of problems in the first half of the twentieth, ancd these concepts were developed theoretically in the second half of this century. The larger the state, however, the less intensely these issues are felt. As a result, they were least salient to the extraordinary superpowers, and not typically considered 'high security issues' during the cold war. With the end of the cold war, the continuing expansion of the international economy, and the growing number of states in the system, these issues will be of increasing consequence in the coming years. In this era, there will be more small states, and, more importantly, all states will be more like small states than they were in the past.
Coercion and punishment
Efforts at economic coercion and punishment, or economic sanctions, have a bad reputation in the public perception and among scholars. Conventional wisdom holds that economic sanctions 'don't work'. This wisdom is flawed, however, and furthermore, economic diplomacy will play an increasingly large role in international relations. With the glue of the Soviet threat no longer in place, conflicts among the western allies will increase and be less constrained. These disputes will almost certainly be fought with economic as opposed to military techniques of statecraft. The collapse of communism has also increased the number of small, market-sensitive economies in the international system, which are particularly vulnerable to economic coercion. Additionally, several great powers, in particular the USA, Germany and Japan, retain global interests but appear disinclined to use force to resolve most conflicts. For all these reasons students of security studies will need a greater understanding of economic statecraft.
Despite Clearly, force often fails. More importantly, success in statecraft is measured in political outcomes. As such, the costs -both political and economic -of a given technique of statecraft must be weighed against the political benefits of success. There may be many instances where military force would be unsuccessful and even more cases where the various costs of using force would be greater than the benefits of success. In those cases, force won't 'work'. Ultimately, it is unproductive to argue whether, in the abstract, economic (or military) statecraft 'doesn't work'. Emphasis should be refocused to elucidate when different tactics will provide states with optimal policies, considering the various costs and benefits associated with different choices. No strategy can guarantee success: all one can hope to do is enact the 'optimal' policy.
Third, finally, it should be noted that it is impossible to evaluate the absolute power of a specific sanction (just as it is impossible to do so for a specific military action). Prospects for success depend on how much the adversary is willing to sacrifice, and this will be different from case to case, depending both on the value the target places on noncompliance and on the objective of the sanction. It is simply impossible to say whether a trade embargo that reduces GNP by 10 percent will 'work' or not. Most likely, there will be cases when it will work and cases when it won't.
Calling attention to these issues still leaves, and in fact increases, the need for additional research on economic sanctions. In particular, two processes require further exploration: the relationship between the imposition of economic sanctions and the level of economic distress in the target, and the relationship between that domestic distress and policy change. These themes are derived from the folk wisdom regarding sanctions. When the sentiment is expressed that sanctions don't 'work', this usually means one of two things: either the sanctions are unable to cause economic distress, or that distress is insufficient to change policy. Sanctions against Rhodesia, Nicaragua and South Africa, for example, were often said to have been unsuccessful because they were circumvented by networks of black markets, dummy corporations and other states' incentives to cheat. Sanctions against Panama, Iraq and Serbia, on the other hand, have been able to cause great economic distress but that remarkable pressure did not translate into desired policy changes.13
Influence and dependence
More subtle than coercion is the political economy of influence and dependence. Dependence results from asymmetries in economic relationships, and from the ways in which those asymmetries change states' preferences. Influence is the flip side of dependence: that which accrues to the dominant partner in an asymmetric relationship. The study of dependence goes back to Hirschman's National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945). Hirschman examined German interwar trading relations, demonstrating how Germany cultivated a series of asymmetric trading relationships with the small states of southeastern Europe, as part of its pre-Second World War grand strategy (see also Fisher, 1939) . Small-state participants in asymmetric economic relationships are much more sensitive to them than are their larger counterparts. Trade between Germany and Bulgaria, to take one example from Hirschman, could account for over half of Bulgaria's total trade while at the same time accounting for a trivial 2 or 3 percent of total German trade. Clearly, Bulgaria was more vulnerable to an interruption of trade than was Germany. This offered the latter considerable leverage over the former.
But dependence is not mainly about leverage, or coercion. It is distinct from coercion, and similar to what Nye has called 'soft power'. Instead of forcing others to do what you want them to do, soft power is about 'getting others to want what you want'.14 Engaging in economic relations, especially those that involve discrimination -such as trade agreements or currency areas -alters the domestic political economy of each state. In asymmetric settings, this shift takes place almost entirely in the small state: its interests converge toward those of the dominant state. As an illustration, consider a small state reaching a free trade agreement with a large state. This causes convergence in three ways. First, the simple act of participation in the arrangement strengthens those who benefit from it relative to those who do not (by definition). This strength should translate into political power (Becker, 1983). Second, firms and sectors engage in patterns of activity based on economic incentives. This constellation of incentives is transformed when the state enacts the new trade agreement. Actors will respond to these incentives, and will form political coalitions to advance their interests (see Kindleberger, 1951; Gourevitch, 1986) . Decisions based on these new incentives give firms a stake in their nations' continued participation, and they will direct their political energies to that end. As Hirschman (1945: 29) noted, 'these regions or industries will exert a powerful influence in favor of a "friendly" attitude towards the state to the imports of which they owe their interests'.15 Third, the central government can find its own interests reshaped, above and beyond the effects of domestic political pressures. 16 It should be made clear that fostering dependence in order to enhance influence is undertaken by states using economic means to advance political goals. This is distinct from dependency, in which power is used to enforce economic extraction. Small states in dependent relationships such as those described above gain economically, both absolutely and relatively: indeed, this is the source of the influence. The USA bore significant costs and tolerated discrimination to promote its postwar trade and monetary regimes. Previously, Britain offered a number of incentives to solidify the sterling area (Drummond, 1981: 254; Stewart, 1937; Bell, 1956: 18) , and this was true of the franc zone as well. One critic of the latter arrangement conceded 'from the economic point of viewv, it is hard to argue' that states were wrong in retaining membership (Kamark, 1967 (Basch, 1943: 178) .
As with coercion, the mechanics of influence and dependence need to be more fully explored. This is particularly challenging because it is difficult to measure the 'success' of these policies for large states. Unlike efforts at coercion, which aim to alter existing behavior, this form of statecraft, even when successful, works invisibly. Measuring altered preferences and their impact on policy decisions is problematic, especially given the challenge of establishing relevant counterfactuals. But powerful states have constantly attempted to use their economic resources to expand their influence. This has taken the form not only of efforts at trade and monetary arrangements, but also the manipulation of aid (Baldwin, 1971; Liska, 1960; Montgomery, 1962 Montgomery, , 1967 Kaplan, 1967) and financial arrangements (Feis, 1930 (Feis, , 1950 At the same time, there are more global international forces at work that challenge state power in a distinct way: they challenge the state's ability to function as an autonomous actor. Questions of autonomy differ from those of influence and dependence in that autonomy, as used here, refers to the power of the state vis-'a-vis stateless forces: markets, firms and individuals. These global market forces can limit and constrain policy, eroding overall national power.
There are a number of manifestations of increasing challenges to state autonomy: expanding international financial networks, enormous foreign exchange markets, increasingly complex international intra-firm trade, competition for foreign investment, and large migratory flows. These 'market forces' present three problems for states. First, private actors may engage in patterns of activity that can diverge from the goals of government policy, creating domestic political barriers to some preferred policies (see Cohen, 1986 , 1992) . Third, particularly in the areas of finance, foreign exchange and foreign investment, there is the possibility that market reactions will undercut and even force a reversal of preferred policies. States need to be sensitive to the possibility that their policies may lead to capital flight, touch off speculation against their currencies, or discourage foreign investment.
It is this third set of issues which appear the most challenging to state autonomy in the contemporary international economy. Increased financial globalization has reduced macroeconomic policy autonomy, and this affects states' ability to increase defense spending, mobilize their military forces, and even engage in behavior that is perceived to risk war.17 Markets can be swift and decisive in imposing their discipline, as seen recently in Mexico. But limited macroeconomic policy autonomy is not restricted to small states, as seen most obviously in the well-known French episode of the early 1980s. In that instance the Socialist government of Franqois Mitterrand was forced, after repeated inability to contain capital flight and following three devaluations of the franc within eighteen months, to reverse course, abandon its expansionary macroeconomic policies, and introduce austerity measures that were more restrictive than those of its conservative predecessor (Sachs and Wyplosz, 1986; Loriaux, 1991; see also Kurzer, 1993) . In this instance, France's national security was not at stake, nor were defense policies at the root of the crisis. But they easily could have been.
France's failure to respond to the German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, for example, was influenced by a dramatic capital flight and speculation against the franc. The German action took place on Saturday, 7 March and on the following Monday selling pressure on the franc was sufficiently severe to bring about British intervention in the market. French hints that they might use force to remove the Germans were followed by a jump in the three-month discount on the franc from 8 to 14 percent per annum. All states in coming years will find their security positions increasingly influenced by political economy. This will not be limited to the rise of modern issues: classical issues will also resurface in the post-cold war era, though in some cases, they will take distinct forms, and can be considered 'new classical issues'. New classical issues focus on the classical concern for economic growth as essential to power. In contemporary politics, this takes a number of forms which all focus around the issue of the economic sustainability of security. Ultimately, the Soviet Union fell not because of military weakness but because of fundamental flaws in its political economy: its impressive military security system was not sustainable. Its defense burden became onerous, it fell further behind technologically, and was unable to produce economic growth. One sure lesson of the cold war is that states cannot afford to ignore the importance of these factors. Regardless of the particular setting, the relationship between defense spending and economic performance remains a complex and contested issue.24 But the ultimate outcome of this debate does not change the fact that the provision of defense will affect the domestic economy, which in t:urn shapes the sustainability of state security, and that there remains a need for students of security to understand these relationships.
The locus of production
New classical issues emphasize the crucial role of economic growth in sustaining national security. Nowhere is this clearer than in the concern for the locus of production: what is produced where. This concerns the national interest because the composition of production can affect growth, because certain industries either have inherently superior growth trajectories or provide positive externalities to the greater economy.
The central question is whether government intervention is necessary to support such industries. This rests crucially on the concept of market failure: that the free market, left to its own devices, would produce sub-optimal economic outcomes.25 Market failures certainly exist,26 but it is necessary to identify them specifically in each case and explain how they can be eliminated by government intervention. For example, if industries offer high growth, why do private actors need any encouragement to invest in them? There are a number of possibilities: private actors may have shorter time horizons, greater risk aversion or fewer resources than the government. Projects that do not offer returns for many years, or have a high probability of failure, or have great startup costs may be underprovided by the private sector. In industries with economies of scale and other advantages to being the first producer, firms may be further inhibited from entry into otherwise promising ventures. This is complicated by 'strategic' behavior -foreign governments (and firms themselves) engaging in measures designed to inhibit entry by others. Such action, it is often argued, can only be countered by competing government intervention. These arguments are not unique to the current era but they are increasingly salient in a world of activist governments and high-technology industries.27
Some grounds for government intervention appear to be even more straightforward. There is a rich Pigovian tradition regarding externalities -those outputs from production not counted in firms' cost calculation. The existence of externalities means that there can be a divergence between private and societal levels of optimal production. This leads to an overproduction of negative externalities, such as pollution, or an underprovision of positive externalities, such as technologies with spin-off applications. As a result, the government should introduce taxes and subsidies to manipulate the production of externalities so that the private and societal optima are equated (Pigou, 1920: 189-96) .
But even this minimal and compelling logic for intervention has been challenged. Coase (1960) has argued that size and scope for Pigovian taxes is much smaller than is usually acknowledged. And even this assumes that externalities can be identified and corrected.28 The problems mount even further in practice. Even if optimal policies could be calculated, would they be introduced? Critics suggest that 'government failure' could lead to greater costs than market failure, and that industrial policies could lead to wasteful rent seeking and crude protectionism, and invite foreign retaliation (see Grossman, 1986; Krueger, 1990) . Finally, there remains the danger that despite avoiding all of the pitfalls mentioned above, the government may still err. In the case of high-definition television, for example, once a rallying point for proponents of activism, US producers currently have the advantage because subsidized European and Japanese competitors committed to the wrong technology (Butler, 1994; Peterson, 1993; Hart, 1994) . 29 An additional danger regarding strategies designed to affect the locus of production is that they may oversell the importance of trade strategy's contribution to the national economy.30 Tyson herself (1992: 2) notes that 'misguided trade policies can be even worse than ineffective', and that 'flawed domestic choices, not unfair foreign trading practices, are the main cause of the nation's long-run economic slowdown' (see also Bergsten and Noland, 1993).
The social economy
Whatever the merits of strategic trade and industrial policy, they do not appear to be of sufficiently great or unambiguous weight to place them within the first rank of new classical security concerns in the contemporary system. But they do call attention to the importance of the management of the domestic economy. While controversy persists regarding the locus of production, there is increasing consensus that government policies which 'get the basics right' are an important element of economic growth. Instead of targeting sectors, such policies emphasize the economic foundations of society, such as education, infrastructure, incentives for savings and investment, and sound macroeconomic policies.31
These concerns underscore a more fundamental issue for the sustainability of security -the question of national vitality. Starting with 'the basics' rooted in new growth theory, this also includes issues associated with the sociological foundation of long-run economic growth. The incentive structure assures that actors will be encouraged to engage in activities that promote economic growth. Just as the absence of government intervention can lead to a divergence of private and social optima, excessive government regulation and taxation can have the same effect. Clear property rights and predictable legal structures also contribute to a convergence between private and social interests (North, 1981) . At the same time, government intervention is crucial in a number of areas, particularly with regard to the provision of public goods, such as a sound infrastructure. Economic activity depends on efficient transportation networks, and this includes not only roads, bridges, rails, canals and airports, but also the transmission of information. Further, these assets will not be fully utilized without sufficient investment in human capital, which is increasingly recognized as a fundamental source of economic growth.32
The economic sustainability of security is also sensitive to social cohesion. The erosion of national vitality, either from internal weakness or domestic conflict, affects not only future economic growth, but also the very ability of states to pursue grand strategies that may require short-term sacrifices for long-run benefits. In Gilpin's model of hegemonic decline, such factors as the corrupting influence of affluence and other social variables figure prominently. Many argue that the British decline -especially the failure to adapt to the technologies of the second industrial revolution -was hastened by sociological factors including a sclerotic and stratified class structure (Gilpin, 1981 One dimension of social cohesion is income distribution, which is an important new classical security issue that affects both current and future state power. With regard to current capabilities, sustained or increasing inequality may contribute to insurrection or rebellion (fundamentally reducing state power) (see Hirschman, 1973; Lichbach, 1989; Mueller and Seligson, 1987) . But as emphasized above, even in the absence of these outcomes, increasing inequality and social conflict will restrict the state's capability to pursue optimal foreign policies due to the hyper-politicization of fiscal policy. Concerning future power, inequality may reduce economic growth. While it was traditionally assumed that a widening and narrowing of inequality was natural over the course of economic development (Kuznets, 1955) , less attention was given to the role of distribution as an independent variable in explaining economic growth. Although it is reasonable to assume that very high levels of equality would yield an incentive structure that could contribute to slower growth, high levels of inequality can also produce such disincentives. Recent research supports the view that economic growth is positively associated with relatively egalitarian distributions of income (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Chang, 1994; Corry and Glyn, 1994) .
In general, new classical issues serve as a reminder that security has both static and dynamic components. Static concerns, such as current force levels and postures, are certainly important. But security is an inherently dynamic concept, and these dynamics rest on issues associated with political economy.
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
In the contemporary international system, all three sets of issues concerning political economy and national security will be of increasing importance. Modern issues will be routinely felt, as all states appear to be more and more like small states in their exposure to and size relative to the international economy. Concerns for coercion, influence, dependence and autonomy will become routine, with the balance of these factors influenced by whether the international economy develops regionally or globally. The security implications of this evolution will be profound, but less dramatic than the challenges that will be raised by manifestations of classical and new classical issues in the short run.
Three areas of the globe stand out as flash points in which political economy will shape the security structure and environment: China, eastern Europe and the United States. China, with its dramatic economic growth and large absolute size, represents a classic example of the war-prone state according to equilibrium theories. Such theories hold that just as the external ambition of the USA, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union all increased commensurate with their economic expansion, as surely as day follows night China will be increasingly assertive in its quest for a place in the sun. Writing in 1988, Kahler argued that international stability was likely to persist 'until the elite of another ascendant power (China?) discovers the means to reinforce its military ambitions with economic success' (Kahler, 1988: 451) . This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the East Asian region is also populated by other states that are likely to have similar, if more modest, expectations of playing a greater role on the world stage (see Roy, 1994; Friedberg, 1993-4) . China, however, remains the central threat. The only factor mitigating this threat is the continuing decentralization and internationalization of the Chinese economy. Decentralization creates new centers of power within China that may inhibit adventurism, and internationalization, at least according to liberal theory, expands the possibility for bargaining and creates incentives to maintain peace. As a result, future Chinese behavior offers a test of competing theories of international relations.35 While China's growth is potentially destabilizing, the same is true of economic stagnation and decline in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. If China is analogous to Germany before the First World War, then this region resembles Germany after that conflict -when economic dislocation and despair contributed to the radicalization of politics and ultimately to war. Once again the peace -this time following the cold war -has economic consequences. Keynes argued in 1919 that the postwar settlement 'includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe, -nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new states of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia' (Keynes, 1919: 226) . The same can be said for the 'settlement' of the cold war, which does not address the dramatic dislocative effects of the collapse of the Soviet empire. While there may be no obvious policy prescriptions, it should be noted that retaining economic stability in this region is a security concern, and further, that the pattern of economic arrangements which does emerge will have fundamental consequences for state power.
The United States faces a distinct challenge in the post-cold war era. Triumphant in the cold war and dominant militarily, the USA nonetheless faces grave threats with regard to the economic sustainability of its security. Victory has left the USA without a clear sense of purpose on the international scene, while at the same time indicators suggest increasing social stresses. Median family income has exhibited no real net growth over the past twenty years, while income inequality has been increasing. Investment in future growth -especially in infrastructure and human capital -has not been sufficient (Thurow, 1992; Klasen, 1994; Baily et al., 1993) . Such factors do not represent a present military challenge, but carry with them a steady erosion of US power.
In fact, the single greatest security threat to the USA in the early postcold war era emanates from the internal atrophy of its national vitality. Social economic problems left unchecked will undermine economic growth and thus future power. They will also increase distributional conflict, making it extremely difficult for the government to mobilize the resources necessary to support far-sighted national goals. This represents a great danger for the international system as a whole, given the possibility that in the absence of a clear threat, these stresses in the US economy will manifest themselves in increasing isolationism.
Regardless of the resolution of these three salient issues, it should be clear that in order to understand international relations in the post-cold war era, it will be necessary to return to business-as-usual, in which the subfields of political economy and security studies are fully integrated. 
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